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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 04-2109
____________
CHRISTOPHER FURNARI,
               Appellant
v.
U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION;
WARDEN FCI ALLENWOOD
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cv-02046)
District Judge:  Honorable Malcolm Muir
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 27, 2005
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, RENDELL and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed : March 8, 2005)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Christopher Furnari (“Furnari”), an inmate at a medium security Federal
Correctional Institution, located in Allenwood, Pennsylvania, appeals from the District
2Court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
Furnari was convicted of various offenses relating to his involvement in organized crime,
and received a 100-year sentence, consisting of five consecutive 20-year terms and
several additional concurrent terms.  We affirm the District Court’s denial of Furnari’s
habeas petition.
I.  Standard of Review and Governing Law
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, this Court exercises plenary review of the
District Court’s legal conclusions.  Wilson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 193 F.3d
195, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  As to this Court’s review of the Parole Commission’s factual
findings, “[t]he inquiry is not whether the [Commission’s decision] is supported by the
preponderance of the evidence, or even by substantial evidence; the inquiry is only
whether there is a rational basis in the record for the [Commission’s] conclusions
embodied in its statement of reasons.”  Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir.
1976).
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a), if an eligible prisoner has substantially complied
with the rules of the institution or institutions to which he has been confined, and if the
Commission, “upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the prisoner,” determines (i) that release would not
depreciate the seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect for the law; and (ii) that
release would not jeopardize the public welfare, subject to other limitations contained in
3this section, the prisoner shall be released.  18 U.S.C. § 4206(a).  The Parole Commission
has adopted guidelines for parole release consideration indicating the customary range of
time to be served before release for various combinations of offense (severity) and
offender (parole prognosis) characteristics.  28 C.F.R. § 20(b).  The guidelines contain
instructions for the rating of certain offense behaviors; however, where especially
mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist, a decision or severity rating different from
that listed may be justified.  Id. § 20(d).
II.  Discussion
The factual background of this action, which is lengthy and complicated, was
thoroughly discussed by the District Court and is known to the parties.  Accordingly, we
will focus in this opinion on the rationale for our decision.
In its March 10, 2004 order, the District Court denied Furnari’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.  On appeal, Furnari argues that the Parole Commission’s reliance on
conduct other than the offense of his conviction to set the offense severity level violated
the Parole Commission’s rules and Due Process.  Specifically, the conduct relied upon
included Furnari’s alleged involvement in murders and an attempted murder due to his
role as a “consigliere” in a crime family.
The Parole Commission has broad discretion to review materials helpful in
determining whether to release a prisoner on parole.  United States ex rel. Goldberg v.
Warden, Allenwood Fed. Prison Camp, 622 F.2d 60, 63 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Fiumara
4v. O’Brien, 889 F.2d 254, 257-58 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding Parole Commission did not
abuse discretion where it considered evidence of prisoner’s involvement of four murders
for which he was not convicted and denied parole); Hackett v. United States Parole
Comm’n, 851 F.2d 127, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding Parole Commission properly
considered victim impact statement, which alleged prisoner raped victim during abduction
for which he was imprisoned, for purposes of parole decision); Maddox v. United States
Parole Comm’n, 821 F.2d 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting Parole Commission’s
broad authority in materials it considers for parole decisions, including dismissed counts
of an indictment, hearsay evidence, and allegations of criminal activity for which prisoner
was not even charged); Melvin v. Petrovsky, 720 F.2d 9, 10 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding
Parole Commission not limited to indictment and conviction in determining severity of
offense and can consider other reliable information, including presentence report). 
Indeed, Congress has even authorized the Commission to view presentence reports
“despite the knowledge that ‘[t]here are no formal limitations on their contents and they
may rest on hearsay and contain information bearing no relation whatever to the crime
with which the defendant is charged.’”  Id. at 64 (citing Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S.
489, 492 (1969)).
Because the Parole Commission has broad discretion in the materials it can
consider in making parole decisions, the Commission was within its authority in relying
upon conduct other than the offense of Furnari’s conviction, including his alleged
5involvement in murders and an attempted murder for which he was neither charged nor
convicted.  Moreover, the Commission’s reliance upon this conduct did not violate
Furnari’s right to Due Process.  Generally, to satisfy Due Process, parole procedures must
provide an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons for the Commission’s
decision.  See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16
(1979).  The Commission’s reliance upon Furnari’s alleged involvement in these other
murders and attempted murder did not implicate either of these rights.
Furnari additionally challenges the Parole Commission’s factual findings with
respect to his alleged involvement in these other murders.  This Court’s review of the
Parole Commission’s findings of fact focuses on whether there is a rational basis in the
record for the Commission’s conclusions embodied in its statement of reasons.  Zannino,
531 F.2d at 691.  Our review of the record assures us that a rational basis in the record
existed for the Commission’s conclusions.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Furnari’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
________________________
